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vision is currently evident in the flourishing numbers of mobile telephones and portable computing units. 
In this paper we briefly investigate some issues concerning the security of mobile computing systems, 
within the framework of the categories of mobility, disconnection, data access modes and scale of 
operation (Imielinski & Badrinath, 1993). In contrast to previous works which concentrate on security in 
wireless communications, we focus on the security of interactions which are built upon the underlying 
wireless communications medium. Some conclusions are presented on the future directions for security 
research in mobile computing systems. 
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Security Issues in Mobile Information Networks 
Thomas HARDJONOt and Jennifer SEBERRytt, Nonmembers 
SUMMARY During the last decade the decrease in the size 
of computing machinery, coupled with the increase in their com-
p~ting powe: has lend to the development of the concept of mo-
?I1e comput.m~. Effects of this new vision is currently evident 
m the flourIshmg numbers of mobile telephones and portable 
computing units. In this paper we briefly investigate some issues 
concerning the security of mobile computing systems, within the 
framework of the categories of mobility, disconnection, data ac-
cess modes and scale of operation (Imielinski & Badrinath, 1993). 
In contrast to previous works which concentrate on security in 
wIreless communications, we focus on the security of interactions 
which are built upon the underlying wireless communications 
medium. Some conclusions are presented on the future direc-
tions for security research in mobile computing systems. 
key words: information security 
1. Introduction 
The birth of "mobile computing" has signalled a new 
era in the field of computing and information systems. 
The concept of mobile computing is derived from the 
realization that as computing machinery decrease in size 
and increase in computing power users will demand 
these machinery to be part of their everyday life, ac-
companying them in the carrying-out of their everyday 
tasks. Researchers in this new field envisage that mo-
bile computing units, such as today's laptops and palm-
tops, in the future will be communicating with each 
other via wireless networks, whilst providing location 
~ransp~rency to the user. This notion of transparency 
IS carned-over from that in distributed computing, in 
which the user is unaware of the remote physical loca-
tion of the resources being used by the distri buted com-
puting system. In the case of mobile computing, how-
ever, several differences emerge. The major difference-
and in contrast to distributed computing-is precisely 
the mobility or the non-fixed positioning of some of the 
computing elements. This difference in itself presents 
various new challenges to researchers in the field. 
The growing interest in mobile computing as a real 
possibility for the future has been driven partly by the 
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popularity of mobile telephone systems, which to a cer-
tain extent has increased the desire on the part of the 
users to have computing available in a similarly mobile 
manner. The nomadic nature of some mobile comput-
ing elements have introduced new problems which were 
non-existent in the traditional areas of computing. New 
solutions and solutions derived from traditional com-
puting are in demand in order to transform the dreams 
of mobile computing into a reality. 
In the notable work of [2J, four categories for fu-
ture developments in mobile wireless computing have 
been proposed, namely mobility, disconnection, data ac-
cess modes and scale of operation. These areas present 
challenges to the traditional approach to distributed 
computing, which until recently have not included ef-
fects of mobility into their design and applications. In 
this paper we would like to propose security as being 
the fifth category which intersects the four categories. 
Similar to the early research efforts during the last two 
decades in the area of traditional computing systems, 
currently much emphasis have been placed on deriving 
solutions which provide for acceptable performance and 
availability, with little stress on the need of security in 
such solutions. 
Unlike previous works which concentrate on com-
munications security in wireless networks [3J, [4J such 
as the European GSM or U.S Digital Cellular (USDC), 
here we wish to focus more on the security of inter-
actions which are built upon the underlying wireless 
communications medium. Each of the four categories 
of[2J introduces differing levels and ranges of security 
requirements, and in this paper we will briefly discuss 
some security issues within the framework of these cat-
egories. The current work is not aimed at providing a 
comprehensive investigation into all aspects of security 
within the mobile computing environment. Rather, this 
paper aims at identifying the broad areas within mobile 
computing which are likely to have immediate security 
concerns, and it hopes to provide some pointers as to 
the direction for future research in mobile computing 
security. 
For simplicity and generality, we will use the terms 
Mobile Unit (MU) for the users and their portable com-
puting unit, Mobile Support Station (MSS) for the sta-
tions which maintain communications with the mobile 
units and Fixed Host for the other nodes connected to 
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Fig. 1 The mobile computing network and its components (after[IJ). 
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Fig. 2 Location servers in the mobile network. 
the mobile support stations [I]. The basic network ar-
chitecture is shown in Fig. l. In addition, Location 
Servers (LS) are employed to keep track of the posi-
tion and actions of each mobile unit. Hence, a given 
location server holds a database containing information 
about a mobile unit registered as having a "home-base" 
in the area or zone managed by the location server and 
about visitors in the area (cell). These location sever 
databases are used to manage and operate the mobile 
wireless network [5J, and as such, they are not directly 
accessible to the mobile units. The data stored in these 
database are used and inter-exchanged only among lo-
cation servers, and between location servers and mobile 
support stations (Fig. 2). The location servers typically 
correspond to mobile switching offices, with approxi-
mately 60 to 100 mobile support stations being catered 
for by one location server [6J 
In the next section we discuss the security issues 
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pertaining to the mobility factor in mobile computing. 
This is followed in Sect. 3 with a discussion on the ef-
fects of disconnections on security. This followed by 
security issues relating to the new access modes within 
mobile computing in Sect. 4 and scale in Sect. 5. Fi-
nally, Sect. 6 closes the paper with some remarks and 
conclusions. 
2. Mobility and Security 
The fact that both users and the data that they carry 
have become a mobile component in computing has in 
itself introduced a set of security problems different to 
that in traditional computing. In the traditional case of 
fixed (non-mobile) computing physical protection could 
easily be afforded by making a computer and database 
system physically isolated from the other components in 
the environment. In such a configuration it was possi-
ble to make the system self-sufficient, without any need 
to communicate with the external world. More recent 
firewall techniques may also be applied to achieve the 
same effect. 
In mobile computing this form of isolation and 
self-sufficiency is difficult to achieve due the relatively 
limited resources available to a mobile unit, thereby ne-
cessitating it to communicate with the mobile support 
station. The mobility of users and the data that they 
carry introduces security problems from the point of 
view of the existence and location of a user (which is 
deemed to be data in themselves) and from the point of 
view the privacy and authenticity of the data exchanged 
between users and between a user and a fixed host. More 
specifically, a user on a mobile wireless network may 
choose to have the information concerning his or her 
existence treated as being confidential. That is, a user 
may choose to remain anonymous to the majority of 
other users on the network, with the exception of a se-
lect number with whom the user often interacts. 
This problem of user anonymity in mobile com-
puting is related to a more difficult problem of the trust 
level afforded by each node in the wireless network and 
the problem of the security of location data concerning 
a user when the location data is stored or transferred 
between nodes as the user moves in a nomadic fashion. 
These nodes must provide some assurance to the user 
about his or her anonymity, independent of the differ-
ing levels of trust that may exist for each node. This 
requirement is of particular importance in the case of 
a user that crosses between two zones which are un-
der two nodes respectively, each having a different trust 
level. Equally important is the secure transfer of data 
between databases at nodes which hold location data 
and other information or parameters in the user profile. 
Here all traffic internal to the network and transparent 
to the nomadic user must be maintained private and au-
thentic. Any notion of trust in this case must be clearly 
expressed and formulated (such as that in [7J), and new 
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formulations may be required specifically for security in 
the mobile computing environment. 
Another potential security problem lies in the pos-
sibility of information leakage through the inference 
made by an attacker masquerading as a mobile support 
station with or without the aid of a subverted mobile 
support station. The attacker which masquerades as a 
mobile support station may issue a number of queries 
to the database at the user's home node or to database 
at other nodes, with the aim of deducing parts of the 
user profile containing the patterns and history of the 
user's movements. Here again, security techniques are 
required both for the databases and for the identifica-
tion of users and mobile support stations. Any scheme 
to be used must ensure that any queries submitted to a 
given database at a user's home-base is accompanied by 
sufficient proof that the user approves of the queries sub-
mitted by the (foreign) mobile support station control-
ling the zone under which the user is currently roaming 
or passing through. It is, therefore, not unreasonable to 
assume that some method of delegation of rights [8J will 
be employed between the user and the mobile support 
stations (and fixed hosts) in the network. 
Related to the management of these databases and 
the provision of performance transparency [6J for the 
nomadic user is the issue of the replication of certain 
parameters and user profiles with the aim of replicating 
the environments surrounding the user. Thus, as the 
user roams across zones, the user must not experience a 
degradation in the access and latency times. Such degra-
dations will reduce the mobile unit response time to the 
user, and thus affect the work of the user. Reasonable 
response times must be maintained to provide mobility 
transparency to the user. Again, security must be con-
sidered in the context of replication, both from the trust 
level of the mobile support stations and fixed hosts and 
from the point of view of data leakage. In general, as 
sensitive data is replicated across several sites, the secu-
rity risks are also increased due to the multiplication of 
the points of attack [9]. 
3. Security in Disconnections 
Another major issue in mobile computing which arises 
from mobility and power (battery) restrictions is dis-
connections. The disconnection of a mobile unit from a 
mobile support station is necessary for the conservation 
of power of the mobile unit. A mobile unit can typically 
find itself running on a temporary form of power sup-
ply (e.g. spare battery) while its main power source is 
being recovered (ie. recharged). In this situation differ-
ing levels of disconnection may be introduced, ranging 
from the normal connection to connections using low 
bandwidth channels. 
A crucial aspect of disconnection is the elective or 
non-elective nature of a disconnection [2]. The non-
elective disconnection refers to the cases when a mo-
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bile unit disconnects due to an unforeseen event, such 
as system crashes or total communications break-down 
when moving into certain geographic regions. The elec-
tive disconnection refers to the user who deliberately 
chooses or elects to disconnect. That is, the planned 
and desired disconnection on the part of the owner of 
the mobile unit who wishes to temporarily limit remote 
access to his or her mobile unit. This type of disconnec-
tion typically covers instances where power availability 
is degrading, where the owner wishes to employ the 
maximum resources (e.g. CPU) available for a short 
task, or where the owner simply desires the mobile unit 
to be put into a "sleep" state. 
In both types of disconnections, a number of po-
tential security loop-holes may be introduced. The tran-
sition from one level of disconnection to another may 
present an opportunity for an attacker to masquerade ei-
ther the mobile unit or the mobile support station. Any 
disconnection transition scheme must ensure that an at-
tacker cannot mimic the mobile unit and then present 
the mobile support station with a false cancellation 
command with regard to the disconnection. That is, 
an attacker should not be able to "hi-jack" the commu-
nications of a mobile unit which is stepping-down its 
level of connection and then masquerading as the mo-
bile unit. Similarly, an attacker must not masquerade as 
a mobile support station to a mobile unit that is about 
to step-up its level of connection. 
One possible sol ution to this problem is for the mo-
bile unit and the mobile support station to agree upon 
a secret before any transition in the levels of elective 
disconnections. When at a later time the mobile unit 
wishes to upgrade the connection level with the mobile 
support station, both parties can start by exchanging the 
shared secret in a secure manner. A good candidate for 
a solution to this problem is zero-knowledge protocols, 
in which the mobile unit and the mobile support station 
can convince each other that they hold the shared secret 
without having to transmit the full secret [10]. Other 
schemes based on smartcards may also be a good can-
didate (e.g. [IIJ). 
Another potential security problem related to dis-
connections is the leaking of information through the 
use of inappropriate concurrency control techniques 
in the database of the mobile unit. During the past 
few years research work in the area of secure con-
currency control techniques have indicated that covert 
channels exist in many standard concurrency control 
algorithms[12J,[13]. A covert channel is created in 
multilevel database systems when one user can indi-
rectly control the abort/commit patterns exhibited by 
the transaction scheduler. These patterns are then ex-
perienced by other transactions belonging to a second 
user. In this manner, the first user can leak data to the 
second user who may not actually have access to the 
data readable by the first user. If a database in a mo-
bile unit is to be accessible by a remote user in the form 
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of the remote user submitting small transactions, then 
the potential for covert channels will exist unless the 
mobile unit employs a suitable and secure concurrency 
control algorithm. 
Related to this issue is the problem of incomplete 
transactions caused by elective and non-elective discon-
nections. A number of scenarios present themselves in 
this context. Security and integrity problems may oc-
cur in the case when hand-oft's occur between two mo-
bile support stations as the mobile unit crosses zones 
(cells). Other security problem may occur when a mo-
bile unit deposits a "timed" transaction at a fixed-node, 
which begins to execute when certain conditions are met 
(e.g. time of day, availability of raw data) and which 
transmits the results back to the nomadic mobile unit. 
These scenarios represent only a few potential security 
problems among many others in the context of levels of 
disconnections and transaction management in mobile 
computing. 
4. Secure Data Access Methods 
One of the advantages of mobile communications de-
rives from the possible use of broadcasting techniques 
to provide services to varying sizes of audience groups 
(users) with minimal change in the delivery cost of the 
services. The work of [14] identifies two methods of 
delivering information to the mobile unit of users by 
a broadcast server, namely through data broadcasting 
and interactive requests. The possibility of continuous 
broadcasting of ever-changing data lends to the attrac-
tive notion of data broadcasting being a public form 
of "memory", where mobile units periodically refresh 
their limited memories (caches) using "data on the air". 
Two important parameters related to the broadcast-
ing of data are access time and tuning time, the first 
referring to the time taken for a reply to be received 
by a client (mobile unit) from the broadcast server, the 
later referring to the amount of time taken by the client 
in "listening" to the channel in order to obtain the se-
lected data. Here, the mobile unit will first listen to an 
"index channel" that delivers a directory related to the 
broadcasted data, then it will proceed to use the direc-
tory information as a guide as to when the mobile unit 
should access the stream of data. Ideally, the mobile 
unit should remain in "doze" mode until the required 
data is being broadcasted, at which time it should auto-
matically wake itself up from this mode. Such a scenario 
is within reach of today's technology (with the minor 
exception of the battery technology that must stilI be 
improved). However, there are a number of issues re-
lated to the privacy, authenticity and integrity of the 
broadcasted data that need to be addressed and solved. 
The first and foremost is the authentication of the 
source of the broadcast (e.g. broadcast server) by the 
mobile units. Since such a broadcast may carry public 
data whose accuracy is paramount (e.g. stock exchange 
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data) and whose authority for publication (e.g. NYSE) 
is accepted by the community, source authentication 
and integrity becomes crucial as minor inaccuracies-
accidental or deliberate-may result in great losses on 
the part of the users. Therefore, methods are needed for 
initial source authentication by the mobile units, and 
for the periodic source re-authentication by the mobile 
units in such a way that it consumes less power than 
the initial authentication. Such methods would be at-
tractive if they use (cryptographic) parameters which 
are embedded within the stream of broadcast data and 
which are recognizable at a given time only by the mo-
bile units that require to perform re-authentication at 
that time. This will also lend to the ability of target-
ing re-authentication procedures for different groups of 
users (mobile units) at different moments in time. 
Together with source authentication comes the 
need to maintaining the integrity of the broadcast data 
stream. Here, a number of possible attack scenarios 
present themsel ves, one being the denial of service attack 
ranging from crude channel interference to the sophis-
ticated modifications of the index channel resulting in 
the mobile unit listening to incorrect (useless or undesir-
able) parts of the broadcast stream. More sophisticated 
attacks may even attempt to substitute segments from 
both the index channel and the data stream in such a 
way that the mobile unit is unaware of the attack. 
The notion of a continuous broadcast of data being 
a public "memory" [14J together with the limited phys-
ical memory (cache) available at the mobile unit leads 
to the important issue of trust accorded by the users 
to the source of broadcast. Since the "public mem-
ory" will become a fleeting entity of a short lifetime, 
accountability of the source and the auditability of the 
broadcast data becomes necessary to prevent fraud when 
the broadcasted data carries commercial value and has 
commercial impact on its recipients. 
5. Scaling Security 
The specific issues relating to security increases in com-
plexity as various components within the mobile net-
work increase in number and in their mode of interac-
tion. The increase in the number of mobile units and 
their wider geographic distribution across regional and 
political boundaries will result in the need for new so-
lutions specific to mobile computing. The potential for 
the proliferation of mobile units may result in the need 
for increase in the size and capacity of the infrastructure 
supporting the network. 
With the increase in number and geographic distri-
bution of mobile units, some basic security functional i-
ties will be required to be provided by the Mobile Sup-
port Stations and Location Servers. Examples of these 
functionalities include large scale key distribution and 
key management solutions, the provision of secrecy and 
authentication across large geographic boundaries with 
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minimal delay, and the secure management of parts of 
the mobile network which are under different manage-
ment bodies (national and international). International 
security policies to regulate trans-border data flows will 
also need to be established as nomadic mobile units 
wander in and out of countries and sensitive regions. 
Currently a number of solutions exist in the area 
of distributed computing systems for the provision of 
security in a globalized computing environment. Hier-
archical key generation, distribution and management 
techniques already exist which are aimed for the tradi-
tional stationary computing systems [15J, [16]. Exten-
sions to these techniques for the mobile environment 
may be a first step towards satisfying the security needs 
of mobile computing. However, new solutions will also 
need to be designed and implemented if security is to 
scale properly in the mobile network. 
6. Remarks and Conclusion 
There is still a long way for research to proceed before 
mobile computing will become a daily reality in society. 
Although considerable effort is being focused towards 
research in mobile computing, much of it is concentrat-
ing on the performance and availability of mobile com-
puting. with comparatively little attention being given 
to the security issues in such an environment. 
In this paper we have proposed security to be a 
major category for future developments in mobile com-
puting. We have discussed briefly the issues of security 
in the context of mobility, disconnection and data access 
methods, presenting a number of potential problems in 
the security of a mobile computing environment. 
The mobile computing environment and its security 
presents a new ground for further research, with some 
problems which are non-existent in the traditional non-
mobile computing environment. Future work on the 
security of mobile computing must address the prob-
lems pertaining to the security of information within 
the three sub-areas of the mobile environment: 
• The security of information residing in the mobile 
units, and the correctness and integrity of data in 
these mobile units. 
• The security of information as it travels "over the 
air" between mobile units and mobile support sta-
tions. An important consideration in this area 
is the power consumption of the algorithms and 
schemes that implement this secure data transfer. 
New secure data storage schemes and data orga-
nization techniques will be required to facilitate 
rapid searching and transfer of data to and from 
mobile units. 
• The security of information within the mobile 
wireless network. This includes the security of 
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databases holding control data used for the op-
erations and management of the mobile wireless 
network. 
These three sub-areas of research will be crucial if mo-
bile computing is to be a reality in the future. 
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